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ABSTRACT 
The effect of different liability rules on the pretrial 
behavior of litigants to a civil suit is analyzed. The interaction is 
modeled as a game of incomplete information, where both the plaintiff 
and the defendant know whether or not they were negligent in actions 
leading to the accident. Selection criteria are used to refine the 
set of sequential equilibria of the game. 
LIABILITY RULES AND PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT 
Jeffrey s. Banks 
1, INTRODUCTION 
The interaction of parties prior to and following the 
occurrence of an accident in which legal recourse to resolve financial 
liability exists currently lacks a fair degree of cohesion. Authors 
such as Brown (1973), Green (1976), Diamond· (1974a, b), and Shavell 
(1983) have studied the effect on caretaking of various liability, or 
cost distribution, rules under the hypothesis that the goal of 
liability law is to create incentives for the efficient use of 
resources in the prevention of accidents [Posner (1972)),1 This work 
has typically ignored the bargaining opportunities available to the 
injurer and victim in a civil suit prior to a court decision, assuming 
instead that the liability rule is enforced without alternative. 
Conversely, the work of Bebchuk (1984), Samuelson (1983), P'ng (1983, 
1 984), and Salant (1984) has focused on the proper modeling of the 
bargaining problem inherent in the legal process subsequent to an 
accident in the study of the strategic aspects of legal settlements, 
while avoiding the comparative analysis undertaken by Brown, Green, 
etc. This is quite understandable given the embryonic nature of 
bargaining theory and the analysis of strategic interaction of parties 
holding private and valuable information. However, explicitly 
2 
incorporating the ability of injurer and victim to come to terms prior 
to trial identifies an area of generalization in regards to research 
into care taking prior to an accident. Papers by Reinganum and Wilde. 
(1985) and Sobel (1985) have focused on the effect of alternative 
court cost allocation schemes and discovery rules in analyzing 
pretrial bargaining models with asymmetric information. Similar work 
in terms of liability rules seems justified. 
This paper is an initial step in such a direction. A model is 
developed which promotes the comparison of liability rules in regards 
to their influence on settlement decisions of injurers and victims in 
a civil suit. Though the model itself is somewhat simplistic, it 
seems to capture the leverage one or another party is granted in terms 
of pretrial bargaining by the liability rules as well as the 
differential behavior of negligent or nonnegligent parties, 
The paper is organized as follows: the following section 
presents the model, the equilibrium concept to be employed, and 
characterizations of the four liability rules to be analyzed: 
negligence, strict liability with contributory negligence, negligence 
with contributory negligence, and strict liability with dual 
contributory negligence. 2 Section 3 describes the equilibria under 
the four liability rules and compares the conditions and the outcomes 
of these equilibria, and Section 4 concludes with some areas of 
further research. 
2. THE MODEL 
Analysis of the settlement and liability issues is based on 
the following sequence of actions and events: an accident occurs 
involving two parties, one of which incurs monetary damages m' > O. 
This party, called the plaintiff, coatleaaly initiates a legal suit 
against the other party, now called the defendant, to recover the 
damages. At issue in the case is the negligence or nonnegligence of 
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both parties in terms of actions directly related to the occurrence of 
the accident. It is assumed that the negligence standard in use is 
common knowledge, but each party's negligence or nonnegligence is 
known only to that party. Given the state of his negligence the 
defendant makes a monetary offer m e  :rn+ to the plaintiff to drop the 
suit. If the plaintiff accepts the offer, the amount' ·m is transferred 
from the defendant to the plaintiff and the case is terminated, If 
the plaintiff rejects the offer, the parties proceed to court, where 
it is assumed that the court determines without error the negligence 
or nonnegligence of each party, and resolves the financial dispute. 
The monetary payoffs for the parties from the court decision are 
functions both of the negligence of each party as well as the 
liability rule in force, where it is assumed that both parties possess 
a priori knowledge of the liability·rule. 
We model this interaction as a game of incomplete information 
[Harsanyi (1967-68)] , where the plaintiff, p, can be one of two types, 
P1 (not negligent), or p2 (negligent), Let P = {p1, p2} , Similarly, 
the defendant, d, can be either d1 (not negligent) or d2 (negligent), 
4 
where D = Cd1, d2} ,  It is assumed that p1 occurs with probability y 
and d1 occurs with probability A, where the random variables pi and d1 
are uncorrelated. The set of pure strategies for d is the nonnegative 
real line :rn +• a strategy for d is a function 
q 
where A:rn is the set of probability distributions on :rn+• Thus + 
q(mldi) is the probability that d offers m, given that his type is d1• 
A pure strategy for p assigns an element of the set A= {a1, a2} for 
each possible offer, where 
accept d's offer, and 
reject d's offer. 
A strategy for p is a function 
r 
where AA is the !-dimensional simplex describing probability 
distributions over (in this case) A. Thus rCa1lm, pj) is the 
probability that p takes action a1, given that d has offered m, and 
p's type is pj' In general, we can describe the utility functions for 
d and p as u(d1, pj, m' ak) and v(d1, pj, m' ak)' respectively. We extend 
these functions to the strategy apace AA by taking expected values; 
let 
Since d has no opportunity to gain information about p's type, we can 
suppress the Pi term in d's utility function by redefining the 
function as: 
Also, for each p e A0 (i.e., probability distributions over D), 
m e JR +, and p j e P, let 
be the best response correspondence for p, given his type. 
The utility payoffs for d and p are as follows: if p accepts 
an offer of m from d, then the payoffs for d and p are (-m,m - m'), 
respectively, regardless of p or d's type. If p rejects d's offer, 
both parties incur court costs (cp,cd > 0, resp. ) and the payoffs are 
determined by p and d's types and the liability rule, but not by d's 
offer. Each liability rule we analyze can be described by a 2 X 2 
matrix, constituting the four underlying states with entries of either 
0 �r 1, where 0 implies that p is liable for the damages and 1 implies 
that d is liable. The payoffs for d and p, respectively, are: 
0 
1 
(-cd,-cp - m') 
(-c - m' -c ) d • p • 
Thus, if p is held liable, he receives no compensation from d, while 
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still incurring the court costs, as does d. [We assume that the 
American system of allocating court costs is in force, where each 
party pays his own costs irrespective of the court's decision.] 
Similarly, if d is held liable, he transfers m' to p, as well as 
paying his court costs (thus, we assume no punitive damages), The 
four liability rules we analyze are: 
1. Negligence3 
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Under the negligence rule, the court's decision is contingent only 
on d's type: i.e., whether or not p was negligent is not at 
issue. 
2. Strict liability with contributory negligence 
Under this rule, d's type is not at issue; d is assumed a priori 
(strictly) liable, but can use as a defense p's (contributory) 
negligence. 
3. Negligence with contributory negligence 
If d is negligent and p is not, then d is liable for damages; 
otherwise p is liable. 
4 .  Strict liability with dual contributory negligence 
If p is negligent and d is not, then p is liable: 
liable. 
otherwise d is 
These rules constitute four of the six "noncomparative" 
liability rules studies by Brown (1973), nonoomparative implying that 
the negligence of either party is not a function of the other party' s 
actions. The two remaining rules, no liability and strict liability, 
can be analyzed as degenerate oases of the strict liability with 
contributory negligence rule, with prior probabilities y = O and 
r = 1, respectively. 
To analyze these games we use a refinement of the divine 
equilibrium concept [Banks and Sobel (1985)] , which is itself a 
refinement of sequential equilibrium [Kreps and Wilson (1982)] , 
Definition: A sequential equilibrium to any of the above games 
consists of strategies {q(•),r(•,•)} for d and p, and beliefs 
�t( · I m) e AD for p such that 
u(di,m•,r(m•,•) = max u(di,m,r(m,•)) me:lll + 
7 8 
2. 
3. 
where pr(di) = A, pr(d2) = 1 - A. 
Thus, in a sequential equilibrium, q(•) maximizes d's expected 
utility, given r(•,•), r(•,•) maximizes p's expected utility, given 
beliefs µ(•), and p' s beliefs are rational given d' s strategy in that 
they satisfy Bayes' rule along the equilibrium path. 
By condition (2), we see that the sequential equilibrium 
concept restricts off-the-equilibrium-path behavior of p in that p is 
allowed to take actions which are best responses to some beliefs over 
AD, thus restricting p to undominated actions away from the 
equilibrium. The beliefs p holds, however, are given no constraints, 
and as such can lead to implausible or "unintuitive" equilibria (cf. 
Kreps (1955)), The key to divinity is that restrictions on beliefs 
are characterized which attempt to embody certain rationality 
postulates concerning these beliefs vis-a-vis the equilibrium path. 
Thus, divinity stresses a rational interdependence between the 
equilibrium path and beliefs at zero-probability events, based on the 
willingness and ability of (in this case) types of defendants to 
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differentiate themselves by deviating from the equilibrium path. [For 
a more complete discussion of this topic, as well as divinity's 
relation to other equilibrium concepts, see Banks and Sobel (1985).J 
We can describe p's (mixed) strategies somewhat more simply as 
2 
an element of AA X AA= AA; i.e., a pair of probability distributions 
over A, one for each type of p. Fix an equilibrium in which di obtains 
utility u•(di), and q(mldi) = 0, i = 1,2. Deleting the argument m 
from p's strategy, define 
AG {r a A
2 
A u(di,m,r) � u•(di), i 1 or i 2}, 
and, for all r e 
2 
AA, let 
'"'·'' 
- L··l) if u(di,m,r) u•(di) if u(di,m,r) u•(di) if u(di,m,r) u •(di) 
be the frequency that di would send m if he believes m would induce 
the response r by p and di had a choice between sending m or obtaining 
u•(di)' [Recall that in d's utility function we've suppressed the 
dependence on p's type by taking expected values.] Next, let 
{p e AD : 3µ(di) e µ(di,r) and c > O s.t. 
cµ(di)pr(di)' i = 1,2}, and 
co [ u r<r>J. 
re A 
For the analysis of the model described above, the key feature so far 
of these restrictions is the following: if µ(di,r) = 1 implies 
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µ(dj,r) = 1, Vr a A!, then for all beliefs in f<A!> it must be that p 
believes dj is at least as likely to defect from the equilibrium to m 
as di. If, for example, i = 1, then this implies that, at m, 
µ(d1) 2 �. We will see below that, given the particular nature of the 
payoffs in the model, this criterion is the key to divinity's 
refinement of the set of sequential equilibria. To continue with the 
2 
definition, let r0 =AD' A0 =AA' and for n > 0, 
if f(An-l) rJ , 
Note that, although divinity was originally conceived for 
signaling games; i.e., where p can be only one type, generalization to 
this model is saved from some difficulties by the fact that, under the 
negligence rule, payoffs are not a function of p's type (so we can 
without loss of generality assume only one type of plaintiff) whereas, 
in the other three liability rules at least one type of plaintiff has 
a dominant strategy, implying that such a type's beat response 
correspondence is (subject to indifference) a singleton. Thus, in 
using divinity to refine the set of sequential equilibria we will 
typically need to inspect the beliefs of only one type of plaintiff. 
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Definition: A sequential equilibrium in the above games is divine if 
it is supported by beliefs in r•. 
1Z 
3. EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES 
3.1 Negligence 
One further criterion we employ is that p1 and Pz do not take weakly Without loss of generality let 
dominated actions in or out of equilibrium. We say that ak weakly 
dominates al if 
for all p e AD with strict inequality for at least one such belief, 
In the next section it can be seen that the offer that makes this 
further refinement nonvaccuous is at m = m' - cp-. Suppose the 
negligence rule is in force and only dz offers m' - op, P is then 
indifferent between accepting 'ca1) and rejecting (az).the offer; 
however, if there were .fillY positive probability of d1 being the 
offeror of m' - op, p should accept (see Fig. 1 below). Hence a1 
dominates a2 for an offer of m' - op. 
This restriction is a characteristic of the perfect 
equilibrium concept [Selten (1975)) , which ·is itself a subset of the 
set of sequential equilibria.4 
D efinition: A divine equilibrium is perfect divine if no weakly 
dominated action is taken in or out of equilibrium with positive 
probability. 
We now proceed to calculate the perfect divine equilibria 
under the four different liability rules. 
r(•l•,p1) = r(•l·,pz) = r(•f •),5 For any offer m, the payoffs for d 
and p can be characterized by the following bi-matrix: 
�I a az 
dl I -m,m - m' -cd'-cp - m' 
dz I -m,m - m' -cd - m' ,-cp 
Define a(m) 
m' - m - cp 
m' ; a(m) is the probability of d1 such that p 
is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer m. Define 
mA = (1 - A)m' - op; given beliefs A, p is indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting mA, 
m' - op 
Note that mA L 0 <=> A { m If 
mA > 0, Fig, 1 describes p's decision problem. Suppose that mA � cd; 
then both d1 and dz would prefer to offer m e [mA,cd] and have it 
accepted, then make any other offer and have it rejected. By Fig. 1 
if both d1 and d2 make an offer m 2. mA, p can (in equilibrium) accept. 
Thus, there exists sequential pooling equilibria m• e [max(O,mA],cdl 
of the form:6 
q•(m•ld ) 1 = q•(m•ld2) = 1, 
" " 
r•Ca1fm) = 1, Vm 2. m•, 
" " " v�r•Ca11m> O, < m•. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
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To check whether any of these pooling equilibria are divine, we use 
the following: given equilibrium payoffs u•(d1) at m• define 
EHmlm•> 
similarly, define 
Since the payoffs of d1 and dz are increasing in r(•}, d1 would prefer 
to deviate if r(·} > e1, and dz would prefer to deviate if r(•}> ez· 
Recalling the conditions for divinity, e1 < ez � µ(d1f m} i A, and 
vice versa. From Fig. 1 we see that, for equilibrium offers m• > mA 
and unsent offer me (mA1m•}, p's beliefs must be such that 
µ(d1f m) < A, in order to reject the offer m, Calculating e1(mf m•} and 
ez <mlm•} we get 
Cd - m 
m' - m• + cd 
m' - m + cd 
aei 
Thus, e1, ez � 1 � m � m•, and > 0, i = 1,Z. Cancelling terms we am 
find that, for m � m•, e1 � ez, as in Fig. Z. 
[Figure Z about here] 
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Thus, divinity implies µ(d1f m> z A; but µCd1lm> 2 A and m > mA 
imply p should accept m with probability one. Thus, the only perfect 
divine pooling equilibrium offer is at 
m• = max {e,mA}, 
However, an offer of mA leaves p indifferent between acceptance and 
rejection, allowing p to mix between these two actions. Thus, a 
complete characterization of the equilibria is: 
a(m' - mA + cd} r<a11m• - op > m > m,) � , ,.. m - m + cd 
Since p will accept � offer from d1 if p knew it was from 
d1, there does not exist a sequential separating equilibrium under the 
negligence rule. There does, however, exist sequential semi-pooling 
equilibria under certain conditions. It is easily shown that it is 
not possible to make both d1 and dz indifferent between making two 
offers; hence the semi-pooling equilibria will consist of dz mixing 
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between two offers, d1 sending one of the offers (the "common" offer) 
with probability one, and p mixing between acceptance and rejection at 
the common offer. From Fig. 1 we see that p will accept with 
probability one an offer of m L m' - cp (by perfection) even if he 
knows its from d2; furthermore it must be that mA L 0 for p to be 
indifferent between acceptance and rejection. Thus, if mA L O, there 
exists (perfect) sequential semi-pooling equilibria with common offer 
m• e [0,min {mA,cd}] . At m•, d2 is indifferent between m• and m' - cp 
if r(a1lm•) solves 
Calculating through, we get 
r•(a1lm•) is always positive, and 
solve 
m' - m• - c 
m' 
which implies 
c0 + Cd 
m' - m• - c0 
m' 
k(m• + c ) 
Thus, the full description of the (perfect) sequential semi-pooling 
equilibria is: for m• e [0,min {mA,cd}] , 
q•(m•ld2) 
q•(m' - c Id ) p 2 
1 
A(m• + c ) 
(1 - A)(m' - m• -
(1 - k)m' - m• -
(1 - k) (m' - m• -
c0 + Cd 
m' - m + cd 
Cp) 
c 
cp) 
To check divinity, we can redefine Gi(;lm•) in terms of the common 
offer m•. Thus, after solving for d11s equilibrium utility, e1c;lm•) 
solves 
calculating, we get 
Since d2•s utility is the same in all the semi-pooling equilibria, 
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op - m', 02c;lm•) is simply the equilibrium mix at m :
Note that, at m• = m, 01 
c0 + Cd 
m' - m + cd 
a01 
= 
__ <_c�d�+ _  c0�>_<_c�d� - m_ •_ >_ > O, 
(cd -
;)
2
(m' - m• + cd) am 
a02
_� -- > o. 
am (m' - m + Cd)
2 
Solving for the ordering of 01 and 02, we get: 
Fig. 3 describes the situation. Thus, divinity requires that 
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-
µ(d1) 2 A for ; � m•, and µ(d1) � A for m 2 m•. However, for m• � mA, 
A� a(m•), so that divinity allows p to reject offers below the common 
offer. Thus, all the (perfect) sequential semi-pooling equilibria are 
perfect divine. 
(i) 
[Figure 3 about here] 
To summarize the results under the negligence rule: 
if mA � cd' there exists a perfect divine pooling equilibrium 
offer at m• = max{O,mA}, which p accepts with positive 
probability. 
(ii) if mA L O, there exist perfect divine semi-pooling equilibria 
with common offer m• e [0,min {mA,cd}J , and where the probability 
of trial is 
3.2 Strict Liability with Contributory Negligence 
Without loss of generality let q(•ld1) = q(•ld2) 
Given an offer m, the payoffs to d and p are: 
�I al a2 
P1 I -m,m - m• -cd - m• ,-op 
P2 I -m,m - m' -cd,-cp - m' 
q(o). 
We see that both p1 and p2 have (weakly) dominant strategies : P1 
should reject all offers less than m' - c , and accept all offers p 
greater than or equal to m' - op and Pz should accept any offer. 
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Since the sequential equilibrium concept limits players to undominated 
strategies off the equilibrium path, p1 and p2 cannot threaten to take 
any other action (e.g. , it is not a sequential equilibrium if 
rCa1lm,p2) < 1, for any m e  lR+>· Thus in a (perfect) sequential 
equilibrium, 
1, \Im, 
if m < m' - op 
if m 2 m' - op • 
For d, given y e  (0,1), any offer m e  (0,m' - op) is dominated by 
offering m = O, given p's equilibrium strategy; similarly 
m e (m' - cp,m) is dominated by offering m m' - op. Thus, in a 
(perfect) sequential equilibrium, 
Now, 
Let m (1 r 
(i) if red 
(ii) if red 
- y)m' 
< my' 
my• 
q•(m) > 0 � m e {0,m' - op). 
u(d,m = o.r•(·)) = -ycd - ym
'; 
u(d,m = m' - cp,r*(•)) = op - m'. 
- op. Thus, we get: 
then q•(m = 0) = 1; 
then q•(m = m' - op) = 1. 
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In words, if ycd < mr ' then the unique (perfect) sequential (hence 
perfect divine) equilibrium is for d to offer m = O, for p1 to reject 
and go to court, and for Pz to accept and drop the case. If ycd > mr • 
then the unique perfect divine equilibrium involves d offering 
m = m' - op• and both p1 and Pz accepting. Note that if r = O, (i) 
always holds ; if p is always liable, then d should give p nothing (as 
in the case of "no liability"). If r = 1, (ii) always holds, and d 
should offer m' - op (as in the case of "strict liability"). 
3,3 Negligence with Contributory Negligence 
For an offer m from d, the payoffs to d and p are: 
zo 
�I al _az 
dl I -m,m - m' -cd,-cp - m' 
dz I -m,m - m' -op - m' ,-op 
P Pz 
�I al az 
dl I -m,m - m' -cd,-cp - m' 
dz I -m,m - m• -cp,-cp - m' 
Note that the decision problem of p1 is similar to that of p under the 
negligence rule, while the decision problem of Pz is similar to that 
of Pz under the strict liability with contributory negligence rule. 
Thus, Fig. 1 characterized p1•s problem, while Pz has a dominant 
strategy to accept any offer. 
As under the negligence rule, there exists a continuum of 
pooling sequential equilibria under certain conditions. Here the 
condition is that m� i red' for d1 can guarantee himself (in expected 
value terms) ycd by sending m = O and having p1 reject and Pz accept. 
Formally, the equilibria are:7 
for 
q•(m• l d ) 1 
,. 
1. Vm 2 m• 
I\ 
r•(a11�, p1) = 0 
Zl 
To check for divinity, we calculate e1cmlm•) and ez<mlm•) as under the 
negligence rule where, since Pz has a dominant strategy to accept any 
Offer, Oi(mlm•) is the probability that pl accepts 
m such that di is 
indifferent between the equilibrium payoffs at m• and deviating to m. 
Thus e1cmlm•) solves 
which gives 
which gives 
(1 - y)m - m• + ycd 
y(cd - ml 
(1 - y)m � m• + y(cd + m') 
y(m' - m + Cd) 
Ordering e1(•) and Oz(•), we get, as under the negligence rule, 
zz 
as in Fig. Z. Thus, the only perfect divine pooling equilibrium offer 
which both P1 and Pz accept with positive probability is at m• = mA. 
There are, however, conditions under which another perfect divine 
pooling equilibrium exists. Suppose that both d1 and dz offer m = o. 
If mA > 0, then Pi will reject the offer (see Fig. 1), and Pz will 
accept, giving d1 a utility of -ycd and dz a utility of -y(cd + m'). 
If r(a1lm, p1) = O, \Im< m' - cp' then the only deviation viable to dz 
is m = m' - cp, which both p1 and Pz will accept. Thus, the condition 
for m• = O to be a (perfect) sequential pooling equilibrium is that 
-y(cd + m') l cp - m', or 
my 2. red. 
Checking divinity, we get that 
implying Fig. 4. 
(1 - r>m 
y(cd -
m) 
, and 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Divinity implies that µCd1l
ml �A, Vm e (O, y(m' + cd)), so that p1 
can reject all offers less than m' - cp in a perfect divine pooling 
equilibrium at m• = O. 
As in the negligence case there exists (perfect) sequential 
semi-pooling equilibria in which d2 is indifferent between offers 
m• i m� and m' -op and mixes between them, and d1 sends m• with 
probability one. Recall that p2 has a dominant strategy: 
r• <a1 Im, p2) = 1, Vm, so that only p1-type plaintiffs mix between 
acceptance and rejection. For p1 to be indifferent he must believe 
m' - m• - c 
that d1 occurs with probability a(m•) m' • For d2 to be 
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indifferent between m• and m' -op it must be that r(a1lm•,p1) solves 
so that 
(1 -r> <m• - m') +red+ cp 
r<m' - m• + cd) 
Now r•(a1f m•,p1) � 1 implies m• � m' - cp' while r•(a11m•,p1) L 0 
implies 
m• , 
(1 -r> m' -red - cp 
L (1 _ r) 
S m. 
Since (as in the negligence case) d2 can only make p1 indifferent for 
offers less than m�, a. condition for the existence of sequential 
semi-pooling equilibria is that 
Also, it must be that � i red; otherwise d1 would be better off 
offering m = 0 and having p1 reject and p2 accept. 
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Since P1 is indifferent at m• in the semi-pooling equilibrium 
and q•(m•fd1) = 1, q•(m•f d2) must solve 
m' - m• - c � 
a(m•) m' � + (1 - �)q•( o ) , or 
which is the same as under the negligence rule. 
To check for divinity, we calculate e1<mlm•) and e2cmlm•). As 
under the negligence rule, 
(1 -r> <m - m') +red+� 
r<m' - iii + c ) d 
while e1cmlm•) solves 
� m'cd - m•cp 
= rce1cmlm•><-m> + <1 - e1cmlm•> > <-cd> J  + <
1 -r> <-m> , m' - m• + cd 
which gives 
(1 -r) [m(cd - m•) - m'(cd - m)] + (cd - m•)(rcd +op) 
r(cd - m)(m' - mt+ Cd) 
As a check, we see that, at m• = iii , 
ae1 = � �
(c� d,,_-�m_ •_ >_ <_c�d_+� cJP� ) � -
- 2 > O, am r<cd - m) (m' - m• + cd) 
Note that these partial derivatives are the same as in the 
semi-pooling equilibria under the negligence rule multiplied by 1/r. 
Thus, all the (perfect) sequential semi-pooling equilibria under the 
rule of negligence with contributory negligence are perfect divine. 
To summarize: 
(i) if mA i red, there exists a perfect divine pooling equilibria 
at m• = max{O,mA}, where both p1 and p2 accept with positive 
probability; 
(ii) if mA > o and red i mr' there exists a perfect divine pooling 
equilibria at m• = 0 where P1 rejects and p2 accepts; 
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(iii) if mA > O, m � mA, m � yod' there exists semi-pooling divine 
equilibria with common offer m• e [m,min{mA,rcdJ] and where the 
probability of trial is 
[y(m' - m• - c >J 
y(m' m• +cd
j 
3.4 Strict Liability with Dual Contributory Negligence 
Given an offer m, the payoffs to d and p are: 
�I al a2 
dl I -m,m - m' -od - m' ,-op 
d2 I -m,m - m' -od - m' ,-op 
Am' 
p 
�I al a2 
dl I -m,m - m' -cd,�cp - m' 
d2 I -m,m - m' -cd - m' ,-op 
Thus the undominated strategies for p1 can be characterized as 
while p2 faces a decision problem similar to that of p in the 
negligence case (see Fig. 1). Again there exist sequential pooling 
equilibria m• 2 mA with the following constraints: 
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(i) m• i cd +rm'; since p1 will reject any offer less than m' - op' 
and in a pooling equilibrium p2 will typically reject all of fers 
lower than the equilibrium offer; and 
(ii) m• i m; since both dl and d2 obtain y(-cd - m') + (1 - y)(-m•) 
in a pooling equilibrium at m•, it must be that d1 and d2 prefer 
this payoff to that which they would receive by offering 
m = m' - op and having it accepted with probability one. 
y(-cd - m') + (1 - r><-m•) 2 op - m', which implies 
In terms of divinity, 
Cd - m• , while 
Cd - m 
Thus, 
m' - m• + cd , so that, 
m' - m + cd 
for m• < m, 01 < 9z and the only perfect divine pooling equilibrium 
offer of this type is at m• = mA, 
Suppose now that m < mA, so that an equilibrium with the above 
conditions fails to exist. Hence both d1 and dz prefer to offer 
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m = m' - op and have it accepted by p1 and Pz than to offer m = mA and
have it accepted only by Pz· Furthermore, if d1 (and hence dz) prefer 
to offer m = m' - op than m O and having ehe offer rejected by both 
P1 and Pz• it must be that 
r(-cd - m') + (1 - y)(-cd) <op - m', 
which implies 
Under these conditions there exists a perfect divine pooling 
equilibrium at m• = m' - op which p1 accepts and where Pz adopts the 
strategy 
To check for divinity, we see that e1cmlm• - cp)solves 
op - m' = y(-cd - m') + (1 - y)[91(
mlm• - cp)(-
m) 
+ (1 - 91(mlm' - cp))(-cd)] 
which implies 
cd + c0 - (1 - y)m' 
c1 - r><cd -
m> 
op - m' = r<-cd - m') + (1 - y) [Gz<
mlm' - cp)(-
m) 
+ (1 - 9z(mlm' - cp))(-cd - m')] 
which gives 
C + Cd 
(1 - y)(m' - m + cd) 
If 91(•), 9z(•) > 1, \I
m, then divinity places no restrictions on 
beliefs. From the above equations we see that 
91(mlm' - op)� 1 <=> m ! m, 
9z(mlm' - op) ! 1 <=> m ! m. 
ZS 
A A 
so there does not exist an offer m such that di would prefer to send m 
under some mixed strategy by Pz while dj would never prefer to deviate 
A 
to m, Since divinity allows Pz to use the prior probability over D 
when the issue is only the ordering of 01 and 9z, and since the prior 
supports Pz's equilibrium strategy (see Fig. 1), the equilibrium is 
perfect divine. 
The (perfect) sequential semi-pooling equilibria in this case 
will involve p1 rejecting the common offer and accepting m = m' - op' 
Pz indifferent between accepting and rejecting the common offer, d1 
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sending the common offer with probability one, and d2 indifferent 
between the common offer and m = m' - cp' Thus, d2 is indifferent at 
m• if r(a11m•,p2) solves 
cp - m' = y(-cd - m') + (1 - y) [r(a1
lm•,p2)(-m•) 
+ (1 - r(a11m•,p2))(-cd - m')] 
or, 
C + Cd 
Now r•(. ) > 0, \Im•, while r•(·) � 1 <=> m• � m, so that m 0 implies 
there does not exist any sequential semi-pooling equilibria. [Note: 
m � o <=> red 2 m1.J 
As above, p2 is indifferent at m• is 
m' - m• - c0 µ(d1lm•) = a(m*) e m' , so that 
Completing the equilibrium strategies, 
{: 
if m < m' - cp 
if m 2 m' - op 
{: 
if m I m•, m < m' 
if m I m• ,m 2 m' 
- op 
- op 
-
Checking divinity, 02c;lm•) is simply p2•s equilibrium mix at m: 
(1 - y)(m' - m + cd) 
while (omitting the algebra) 
(1 - y)(cd -
;)(m' - m• + cd) 
a01 = __ _ 
<_ c_,,,d_+_c_.p� >_<_c=d_-_m_ •_) 
- 2 am (1 - y)(cd - m) (m' - m• + cd) 
> 0, 
a02 = _ _ _ 
<
_
c
..,__
+_c__, d,_
> 
_ _ 
_ 
2 > O, am (1 - y)(m' - ;+ cd) 
which are the partial derivatives of 91(·) and 92(•) under the 
negligence rule multiplied by 1/(1 - y). Hence the semi-pooling 
sequential equilibria, with common offer m• e [0,min(m,mA,cd + ym'] 
are perfect divine. In summary: 
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(i) if mA � m, mA � cd + ym', there exists a perfect divine pooling 
equilibria at m = mA which p1 rejects and p2 accepts; 
(ii) if m < mA and m1 < cd' there exists a perfect divine pooling 
equilibria at m = m' - op, which both p1 and p2 accept; 
(iii) if mA 2 0 and m 2 0 there exist perfect divine semi-pooling 
equilibria with common offer m• e [0,min(m,mA,od + ym'J] . The 
probability of trial is 
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[
' + 
(1 - )..))..(m•+c ) l [ (1 - y)(m' - m•) - ycd -�l 
" (1 - )..)(m•-m• -cp) 
• y+ m'-m•+cd 
)..m' 
m' - m• + cd 
3.5 Summary 
The perfect divine equilibrium paths under the four liability 
rules are: 
1. negligence 
(i) if m).. � cd, there exists a pooling equilibrium offer at 
m• = max{O,m)..}, which p accepts with positive probability; the 
maximum probability of rejection is )..m' • cp + )..m' + cd' 
(ii) if m).. L 0, there exist semi-pooling equilibria with common 
offer m• e [O,min{m)..,cd}], where p mixes between acceptance and 
rejection; the probability of rejection (hence a trial 
decision) at m• is , �· + • m -m cd 
2. strict liability with contributory negligence 
(i) if ycd < my' th� equilibrium offer by d is at m• = O, which p1 
rejects and p2 accepts; thus the probability of trial is 
Pr(p1) = y; 
(ii) if ycd > my' the equilibrium offer is at m• = m
' - cp' which 
both p1 and p2 accept. 
3. negligence with contributory negligence 
(i) if m).. � ycd, there exists a pooling equilibrium offer at 
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m• = max{O,m)..}, which p2 accepts with probability one and p1 
accepts with positive probability. The maximum probability of 
rejection by p1 is cp + 
)..m' + cd
' 
(ii) if m).. 
> 0 and ycc < my' there exists a pooling equilibrium 
offer at m• = 0, which p1 rejects and p2 accepts; thus the 
probability of trial is Pr(p1) = y; 
(iii) if mi.. 2 o, m � mi.., m � ycd' there exist semi-pooling equilibria 
with common offer m• e [m,min{m)..,ycd}] which p2 accepts and p1 
mixes between acceptance and rejection; the probability of 
trial at m• is )..m' m' - m• + cd
• 
4. strict liability with dual contributory negligence 
(i) if m).. � m and m).. � Cd+ ym', there exists a pooling equilibrium 
offer at m• = max{O,m)..}, which p1 rejects and Pz accepts with 
positive probability; the probability of trial is at least 
Pr(p1) y; 
(ii) if m � m).. and my � cd' there exists a pooling equilibrium offer 
at m• = m' - cp, which both p1 and p2 accept; 
(iii) if m } O, m).. L O, there exist semi-pooling equilibria with 
common offer m• e [O,min{m,m)..,cd + ym'}], where the probability 
of trial at m• is )..m' m' - m• + cd' 
Since ycd > m <=> m � O, there exist comparisons between the perfect - y 
divine equilibria of different liability rules in terms of the set of 
parameters for which the equilibria exist. The most interesting 
comparison seems to be negligence v. negligence with contributory 
negligence, and strict liability with contributory negligence v. 
strict liability with dual contributory negligence, which for 
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notational simplicity we label n, non, slcn, sldcn, respectively. We 
begin by partitioning the space of parameters into two sets. 
m' -c 
A. mA < 0 (i. e. , A> �).
(i) There exist no semi-pooling equilibria. 
(ii) If there exists a pooling equilibrium at m• = 0 under slcn, 
then there exists a pooling equilibrium at m• = 0 under sldcn; 
thus, the equilibrium m• = O exists "more often" (in terms of a 
probability distribution over parameter values) under sldcn 
than under slcn, 
(iii) If there exists a pooling equilibrium at m• = m' op under 
sldcn, then there exists a pooling equilibrium at m• = m' - op 
under slcn. 
(iv) The only equilibria under n and ncn is at m• o. 
B. mA L 0,
(i) The pooling equilibrium offer m• 
under sldcn than under slcn. 
(ii) The pooling equilibrium offer m• 
slcn than under sldcn. 
(iii) The pooling equilibrium offer m• 
than under ncn. 
m' - op exists more often 
O exists more often under 
mA exists more of ten under n 
(iv) The pooling equilibrium offer m• 
ncn than under n. 
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O exists more often under 
(v) The semi-pooling equilibria exist more often under n than under 
ncn; more over, the set of common offers is smaller under non 
than under n. 
Thus we see that, given mA 2 0, the pooling offers tend to be smaller 
going from n to ncn and slcn to sldcn, while with mA < O there is no 
difference between n and non, and the pooling offers are on average 
larger under sldcn than under slcn. 
4. CONCLUSION 
We have seen how the liability rule in force can influence the 
behavior of plaintiff and defendant in the pretrial bargaining of a 
civil suit. A generalization of the model would be to allow the 
plaintiff the ability to make the first offer, which the defendant can 
either accept or make a counteroffer, and the plaintiff either 
accepting this or rejecting and going to court. This would allow the 
defendant the opportunity to gain insight into the plaintiff's type 
prior to making his offer, an opportunity which does not exist in the 
model above. Note that, if the defendant rejected a pooled offer from 
the plaintiff, the subsequent behavior would fall directly under the 
model of this paper; given a pooled offer by the plaintiff, the 
defendant gains no information; given that he's rejected the offer, he 
proceeds to make his own offer. 
In terms of analyzing behavior prior to an accident, notice 
m' - op that defendants prefer outcomes when m� < O; i.e., � > m' , so 
that for a fixed damage size m', there is an incentive as a group to 
maintain a high prior probability of nonnegligenoe in the eyes of 
potential plaintiffs. Similarly, plaintiffs prefer outcomes when 
m' -o ---12 � m' red 2 my; i.e., y 2 m' + 0d 
and m < m�; i.e. , 0d + 0P 
< {l _ y)�' so 
that there are incentives for {potential) plaintiffs to maintain a 
high probability of nonnegligenoe as a group. Analysis such as this 
is fairly ad hoc, however; a more complete development will be the 
topic of subsequent papers. 
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NOTES 
• I would like to thank participants in the Caltech Theory Workshop 
for helpful comments and suggestions. 
1. Epstein (1973) posits an alternative goal of liability law, that 
of "corrective justice." 
2. Two other rules, no liability and strict liability, will be seen to 
be degenerate oases of strict liability with contributory negligence, 
3. P'ng's (1984) analysis basically deals with this rule. 
4. Of course, one could have initially defined perfect equilibrium 
and subsequently added divinity; however, divinity grew out of the 
methodology of the sequential equilibrium concept and as such is 
easier to characterize as a refinement of sequential equilibrium. 
S. Since the payoffs are not a function of the plaintiff's type, the 
plaintiff's strategy can be a nontrivial function of type only if 
he is indifferent between a1 and a2• In this case, the {mixed) 
strategies of the plaintiff below can be interpreted as those 
which arise after taking expectations over p1 and p2• 
6. Some mixing between a1 and a2 is allowed out of equilibrium, as 
shown below; this does not alter the set of nondivine sequential 
equilibria. 
7. See note 6 above. 
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